Philosophy Club Meeting: Running Judgments
Running Judgements: How We Really Know What We Really Know
Please join us in Auerbach 320 or online this Wednesday, Nov. 2, from 1 p.m. – 2 for our next meeting of the University of Hartford Philosophy Club as Brian Skelly presents Running Judgments: How We Really Know What We Really Know
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If you have trouble joining, call Brian Skelly at 413-273-2273.
One nagging philosophical problem of knowledge is that although it seems that we can know, it is hard to say how we know. One of the main troubles in this regard is when, if ever, we are justified in being convinced that something, p, is true even though the evidence is never completely in. Assuming only a finite amount of evidence to be sifted, prudence suggests withholding judgment until all the evidence is in and duly analyzed. But it is arguably the case the evidence is never all in. This leads either to the pessimistic conclusion that we can’t know because we never have enough evidence or to the search for a “fallible” standard of justification: one that gives us sufficient reason to be convinced that p even though possibly p is false.
The dilemma is that of choosing between a standard of justification that seems weak and even wishy-washy and that we have no knowledge at all. On the one hand, we sympathize with the ideal of perfect, comprehensive knowledge, even though we can see it is out of our reach. From there we struggle with the notion that anything imperfect, in which justification does not guarantee truth¸ deserves to be called knowledge. The predicament we are in is that for any claim p at any frozen instant in time there is a noticeable gap in the evidence we have and the evidence we yet lack that would warrant the conclusion that p. The question is: what, if anything, can give reason for us to ignore that gap and conclude that p anyway?
Here I propose that in a sense we must choose both horns of the dilemma: for any claim, p, there is a sense in which we cannot know that p and another sense just as important that we can know p. The sense in which we can’t know p is in the form of “frozen” judgments; that is, on the basis of evidence considered at any one instant. The sense in which we can know p is in the form of “running” judgments, that is, judgments made over the course of time, whose justification is based on notice of the judgment approaching complete evidence as an asymptotic limit over the course of time.
Before getting to this, let me first go back and solidify the initial points made above in framing the issue: that it seems that we can know, that the evidence is never all in, and that fallibilist justification appears both weak and wishy-washy from a certain reasonable perspective not to be dismissed offhand.
It seems that we can know because, although we can’t point to any one perfect case, we can point to a whole spectrum of cases of knowing things more or less, with the best cases achieving certainty at least in a practical if not absolute sense. Included in these, e.g., are basic arithmetic truths, taxonomical facts, basic moral principles, and observed states of affairs.
In spite of this appearance, we must concede that the evidence is never all in. For we never complete science or mathematics and will never be able to say exactly what numbers are; these two impugn any claim that my knowledge even that two plus two equals four is comprehensive. Nor can I ever know myself or anyone else completely, nor the solar system. There are always a countless infinity of things left to observe or to be noticed. (Full document attached)
An ongoing weekly tradition at the University since 2001, the University of Hartford Philosophy Club is a place where students, professors, and people from the community at large meet as peers. Sometimes presentations are given, followed by discussion. Other times, topics are hashed out by the whole group.
Presenters may be students, professors, or people from the community. Anyone can offer to present a topic. The mode of presentation may be as formal or informal as the presenter chooses.
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For more information, please contact Brian Skelly at bskelly@hartford.edu